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Abstract  
This research article proposes to undertake a critical review of Oliver Williamson’s law 
and economic theory from the analysis of collective labour relationships in the United 
States. From a positive point of view, the 2009 Nobel Prize laureate explains that law 
determines the rules of play (public ordering), and then individuals freely negotiate the 
rules that constitute the institutions of governance (private ordering). From a normative 
perspective, Williamson argues that this partition is efficient with respect to the 
economizing logic of individuals. However, we show that, actually, the American law 
of labour relationships is based on legal pluralism and that the model of private 
ordering, which has been less and less used since the 1980s, has strong limitations. In 
this context, the analysis of the public ordering/private ordering framework that 
Williamson proposes is of little interest. 
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Introduction 
In several research articles, Williamson sheds light on the interdisciplinary aspect of his 
thoughts. His main aim is to contribute to the development of a ‛science of 
administration’ (Williamson, 1990, 1993a, 1993b, 2005) that combines economics, 
organisation theory, and law. The close relationship between organisation theory and 
transaction cost economics (TCE) ‛has been often ignored in theoretical debates on the 
firm’ (Baudry and Chassagnon, 2010: 477). However, this shortcoming also seems to be 
the case for the relationship between law and TCE. Indeed, if some studies have 
revealed an interest in this relationship from a general perspective (Dugger, 1996 or 
Hodgson, 2009), the importance of labour law in TCE has rarely been seriously 
investigated.   
Williamson has often explained his approach to law in different papers 
(Williamson, 1998, 2000, 2002). According to him, there is a combination of formal 
rules that result from the public ordering and the rules that come under the private 
ordering. This connection between different types of rules is based on the distinction he 
makes between four levels of social analysis. Level 1 is the level of social 
embeddedness, whereas level 4 is based on the allocation of resources. The institutional 
environment and the domain of governance, which refer, respectively, to levels 2 and 3, 
on which TCE focuses, correspond to the two types of ordering.  
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Regarding level 2, the legal rules that constitute the public ordering are included in 
the institutional environment, and they fix a positive legal framework. These rules are, 
hence, the product of the political regime, and they provide the rules of play from which 
economic activities are organised (North, 2005). Political and legal systems and 
administrations are located at this level, in which the laws of private property are 
crucial. All of these legal instruments form the formal rules of play. Level 3 concerns 
the institutions of governance, the main level of analysis of Williamson’s TCE. The 
rules of play of level 2 appear to be parameters, whereas level 3 is the domain of play of 
the game (of the exercise conditions of play). Thus, level 3 is the domain of private 
ordering. Indeed, for Williamson (2000), it seems evident that regarding the 
imperfections and incompleteness of both the legal system and the contract safeguards, 
‛much of the contract management and dispute settlement action is dealt with directly 
by the parties—through private ordering’ (Williamson, 2000: 599). Contracting parties 
have the latitude to arrange this framework in accord with their preferences and goals to 
implement the best governance structure. Hence, Williamson refers to the works of 
Llewellyn (1931) and MacNeil (1978) to affirm that the contract constitutes only a 
simple legal framework. In this view, the play of the game ‛is usefully interpreted as 
private ordering efforts to influence order and, thereby, thereby to mitigate conflict and 
better realize the mutuality of advantage voluntary exchange’ (Williamson, 2002: 440; 
Buchanan, 1987).  
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According to Williamson, neither the private ordering nor the public ordering 
(legal centralism) are ‛pure forms’ of ordering. Williamson (1985) argues that ‛between 
contrasting fictions, the private ordering fiction is at least as instructive as that of legal 
centralism’ (Williamson, 1985: 168). However, as we will see in the next sections, this 
fiction is too far away to be close to the reality of the labour relationships, notably since 
the beginning of the 1970-1980 period. The very general theoretical framework of 
Williamson is applied to the labour relationships in the United Sates, which strengthens 
the interest in his approach. More precisely, it seems that Williamson has been strongly 
influenced by the dominant model of the post Second World War period in building this 
specific theoretical framework. Indeed, for Williamson, this model ‛consecrates’ the 
autonomy of parties (employers and unions) that characterises private ordering by 
isolating the firm from the central legal ordering – i.e., public ordering. That is why 
Williamson matches this private model of labour regulation against the judicial model 
of labour regulation. 
Hence, the reasoning of Williamson seems to be the following: he wants (1) to shed 
light on the importance of private ordering in the collective labour relationships in the 
United States and (2) to show the superiority of private ordering compared to public 
ordering in terms of efficiency. In other words, in the economizing logic of TCE, the 
fact that the private ordering model is prevailing could be seen as a consequence of the 
efficiency of this mode of coordination of employers and employees. The research 
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objective of this article is, hence, to question the interest in and relevance of these three 
complementary propositions. Is the Williamson theoretical framework empirically 
correct in the case of collective labour relationships in United States? What is really the 
meaning Williamson gives to the notion of private ordering? Is the divide between 
private and public orderings accurate? If this fiction seemed to be partly right until the 
1970s, it is no longer the case after this period, owing to the evolution of both collective 
labour relationships and the role of the State. Therefore, is the model of collective 
labour relationships analysed by Williamson more efficient than the judicial one? What 
is ultimately the nature of the conception of law advocated by Williamson? Following 
the economizing logic characterising the rational individual and the argument of State 
dysfunctions, is the intervention of the State completely useless? Is the dichotomy 
between  level 2 and level 3 accurate and empirically right? 
To answer these questions, this article is organised into two main sections. In 
Section 1, we examine the labour relationships that prevailed in the United States after 
the Second World War in relation to the utilisation that Williamson makes of them. 
Additionally, we focus on the elements that lead Williamson to perceive the efficiency 
of this model of labour relationships regulation. In Section 2, we shed light on the 
ambiguity and confusing aspects of Williamson’s thought. Indeed, even if it is true that 
Williamson is acquainted with the law of collective relationships, his analysis of private 
ordering is not clear because the American model of labour relationships regulation is 
6	
	
based on legal pluralism (Galanter, 1981). This lack of clarity means that there are 
different sources of law, including the private ordering of the firm. Furthermore, the 
evolution of State law in the United States since the 1970s, on the one hand, and the 
decrease in union member workers and, therefore, the effectiveness of the collective 
bargaining model, on the other hand, cast doubt, from both a positive and empirical 
perspective, on the relevance of the Williamson model, based on a clean break between 
private ordering and public ordering. This deficiency is why, even from a normative 
point of view, the private ordering model has serious limitations. It explains 
Williamson’s decline as an authority for several years. Furthermore, the role of the State 
seems to be more and more important in the regulation of labour relationships.  
The Williamsonian Model of Collective Labour Relationships 
Regulation: Private Ordering and Efficiency 
After presenting the system of labour relationships prevailing in the United States after 
the Second World War, we relate this system to Williamson’s concept. Then, we show 
the arguments Williamson used to justify the efficiency of this specific model.  
The collective labour relationships originating from the Wagner Act: the foundations 
of the private ordering model 
American collective relationships have been legally framed by the Wagner Act and the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which regulate the creation and control of 
collective norms in American firms. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 
(amended in 1947, 1959 and 1974) is at the core of the distinction between the so-called 
7	
	
organised sector, which includes all the firms whose employees are represented by 
union organisations, and the so-called non-organised sector, which does not benefit 
from representation. This distinction is crucial because these two models correspond to 
two distinct fields of American law: labour law and employment law. It is important to 
add that the percentage of union member employees was 35% at the beginning of the 
1950s. This fact means that the organised sector represented less than half of a firm’s 
employees (this rate has regularly been decreasing from the 1950s and the organised 
sector is currently a large minority (apRoberts and Simonet, 2009).  
Concerning the bargaining process of the firms in the organised sector, two phases 
can be observed. The first phase consists of determining the framework in which the 
collective bargaining will take place – what is called the appropriate bargaining unit. 
The second phase refers to collective bargaining, as such. The appropriate bargaining 
unit is the domain according to the size of the employer, the organisation, the building 
trade or a sub-unit of one of these units. The NLRB considers that the organisation is 
the more appropriate unit. It is within this framework that employees’ rights to be 
organised are pushed forward. These rights result in employees being represented, at the 
conclusion of an absolute majority voting, by a union to negotiate with the employer. If 
the majority of employees declares itself in favour of a union, this union becomes the 
exclusive representative of all employees composing the unit. The collective bargaining 
process leads to an appropriate law that governs the labour relationships in the given 
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unity. This legal dimension occurs at two levels. The first level involves the legislative 
procedure: the collective convention becomes the ‛law of the firm’. This convention 
applies to all aspects of the labour relationship, such as wages, qualification, working 
hours, and security. The second level is the administrative one. It consists of governing 
the agreement and, notably, the dispute settlement that could be individual or collective. 
Here, arbitration, which encompasses the totality of collective conventions, plays a 
crucial role.  
Arbitration is used in dispute resolution by designating, by mutual agreement, an 
impartial third party. Thus, the conflicting parties accept being linked and guided by a 
given resolution. This approach is a private mode of dispute resolution. The role of 
private arbitration is, hence, settling conflicts coming from the application and 
interpretation of the collective agreement. Parties themselves choose the arbitrator, pay 
for that person, establish his or her competences and determine the procedure to which 
he or she must submit. The conflict remains within the unit chosen during the 
bargaining process because the arbitrator allows bypassing the recourse to a judge 
representing the public authority. The competences and powers of the arbitrator result 
from the normative autonomy of parties, and they are totally subordinated to the 
volition of the social partners. Additionally, the union that ‛signs’ the collective 
convention can deprive the employees of the right to bring the dispute to justice, when 
an arbitrator has been assigned to resolve the disputes resulting from the application of 
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the collective convention. The growth of arbitration in the United States confirms the 
existence of a professional legal ordering that is recognised by the State legal ordering.  
Regarding Williamson’s books of 1975 and 1985, which constitute the only two 
contributions to collective labour relationships, we can observe that he has a good 
knowledge of productive law and of the more influential scholars’ works on labour law 
that have analysed the American model. Moreover, what Williamson characterises as 
private ordering seems to strongly correspond to the model of collective labour 
relationships that we have just described – notably one concerning the so-called 
organised sector. In his 1985 book, Williamson quotes the Wagner Act and the National 
Labor Relations Board that governs the production and control of the collective norms 
in the American firm. Globally, the two main components of the collective relationships 
asserted by the Wagner Act are (1) a bargaining and collective agreement concluded 
between the employer and the union and (2) a procedure for the settlement of disputes 
based on the private ordering resolution. When Williamson analyses the logic of the 
internal labour market (Doeringer and Piore, 1971), he argues−for example, in his 1975 
book−that the rules of these specific markets are implemented through collective 
bargaining. Williamson is also interested in the second aspect of collective labour 
relationships, namely, the mechanism of private arbitration. He devotes great attention 
to it in his 1975 and 1985 books. He uses, notably, the expression, ‛special arbitration 
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machinery’ (Williamson, 1985: 10). Thus, in agreement with the positive law, 
Williamson shows that it is the union that controls disputes and conflicts.  
Williamson reminds us of the importance of the works of some lawyers, such as 
Shulman (1955), Cox (1958), Summers (1969, 1982) and Stone (1981). These legal 
scholars are useful for Williamson in the sense that they raise the question of the nature 
of the collective agreement concluded between the employer and the union. The answer 
that they bring to this question is crucial because they consider that the collective 
agreement is a long-term contract establishing a simple legal framework. Williamson 
uses, in support of this thesis, the paper of Cox (1958), for whom ‛the collective 
bargaining agreement is an instrument of governance as well as an instrument of 
exchange’ (Cox, 1958: 22). He also quotes Shulman, who considers that the Act should 
be appreciated as a legal framework in which the private ordering between management 
and labour takes place. In addition, Summers (1969) gives real interpretative latitude to 
legal rules. Through his specific conception of law, Williamson proclaims that private 
ordering is the dominant model of labour relationships regulation.  
Finally, the American model of collective labour relationships and the associated 
distinction between the ‛organized firm’ and the ‛non-organized firm’ seem to 
empirically correspond to what Williamson calls the private ordering. The NLRA is not 
an instrument of public interventionism in professional relationships. It is simply a law 
that gives parties (employers and employees) the resources to produce a conventional 
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law of the firm through the collective bargaining process. The autonomy of co-
contractors (employers and unions) is, in this view, complete, from the bargaining to the 
conflict settlement processes. The system developed by the NLRA appears to be a self-
contained and self-sufficient system, in which the power is shared between the 
employer and the representing union of the workforce. The notion of private ordering 
used by Williamson seems, therefore, to be confusing and ambiguous (see the assertion 
below) because for him private ordering is an efficient source of law, even though it is 
different from State law.  
The efficiency of Williamson’s private ordering model  
The works of Williamson also have a normative dimension because he wants to show 
the superiority of the legal model, based on private ordering in terms of labour 
relationships, compared with the model based on legal centralism and public ordering. 
Indeed, if Williamson does not contest the existence of positive legal rules, his ambition 
is clearly to  supplant ‛the academic concept of contract as legal rules by that of private 
ordering and by inquiring into the mechanisms through which transaction cost 
economizing is accomplished’ (Williamson, 2005: 388). Thus, it is important for 
Williamson to show that the role of the State is providing help in the individual 
coordination of labour relationships. To justify the superiority of the model of private 
ordering in the case of collective labour relationships, he uses three distinct arguments.  
First, according to Williamson, collective bargaining with unions serves the 
efficiency of the relationship in different ways. The union has the role of ‛agent’ to play 
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in terms of information on the preferences of employees. Additionally, and more 
fundamentally, the union also has the role of governance because it has to insure the 
continuity of the relationship between the employer and ‛his’ employees when some 
important specific human assets are engaged in the economic relationship. The union 
also contributes by moderating a potentially excessive increase in employees’ wages 
that could penalise the financial health of the firm. It is important to add (and it is an 
argument complementary to the previous ones used to justify the superiority of 
arbitration over judicial action) that giving control over individual conflicts to the union 
allows it to gain acceptance as serving the interests of the group and not the interests of 
the individual. In the view of Cox (1958), Williamson argues that entitling an individual 
to use the procedure of arbitration would discourage the employer and the union from 
cooperating in everyday activities.  
Therefore, because of collective bargaining, the firm implements an internal labour 
market endowed with explicit and institutionalised rules in terms of both the wage grid 
and the promotion system. Departing from the work of Doeringer and Piore (1971), 
Williamson (1975) notices that ‛the internal labour market achieves a fundamental 
transformation by shifting to a system where wage rates are attached mainly to jobs 
rather than to workers’ (Williamson, 1975: 74). These formal rules lead to efficiency 
because they foster a cooperative attitude from employers and employees, who have the 
common interest of continuing the exchange relationship.  
Finally, it is evident that the question of dispute and conflict settlement is crucial 
for Williamson. He underscores, several times, the superiority of arbitration and 
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grievance procedure over judges and courts in the presence of disputes and conflicts. In 
the view of Galanter (1981), Williamson considers that, in a lot of different situations, 
protagonists can find private solutions to settle disputes that are more efficient than the 
solutions proposed by judges, who are forced to apply general rules without having a 
good knowledge of the nature and the context of these disputes and conflicts. In other 
words, in a perfect world, where economic transactions are based on a perfectly 
identified good, i.e., the model of the pure exchange, a court can be efficient for settling 
disputes and conflicts. The challenge is very different in the case of the employment 
relationship based on a long-term, incomplete contract (Coase, 1937; Simon, 1951). 
Indeed, the parties engaged in an internal conflict have a better knowledge of the 
context and ‛circumstances’ of this conflict than does the court with its information. 
Furthermore, Williamson (2002) explains that settling these disputes by way of the 
courts would reduce the efficiency and integrity of the hierarchy. In any case, courts 
refuse to judge intra-firm disputes about transfer prices between divisions, delivery 
time, and quality default. Finally, Williamson’s model of resolution of disputes 
constitutes for him a way to preserve a healthy organisational atmosphere, whereas, on 
the contrary, the recourse to courts to resolve conflicts is a threat to the integrity of the 
firm (Baudry and Chassagnon, 2010).	 
Williamson analyses the private ordering from the lens of the advantages of the 
grievance and arbitration procedure. This procedure, which is assessed by Williamson 
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(1975) ‛in the language of the organizational failures framework’ (Williamson, 1975: 
76), has several advantages. First, this disposition allows for overcoming the problem of 
asymmetrical information because the arbitrator is able to analyse, more deeply, the 
facts in relation to different judicial procedures. Indeed, the arbitrator can notice the 
idiosyncratic character of the firm. Additionally, the knowledge that the arbitrator has of 
the firm can dissuade opportunistic behaviours, which gives the union control over 
individual conflicts to the advantage of collective interests. The important powers given 
to the union reveal the supremacy of collective rights over individual rights. The group 
has its own interest, which is defended by the union. Thus, every individual demand is 
given up to the advantage of the group’s choice. Therefore, the grievance procedure and 
arbitration must be preferred to the judicial disposition of conflicts settlement in 
consequence of the negative effects, resulting from a conflicting process, on the 
continuity of the relationships (see Williamson, 1985). Ultimately, arbitration is an 
efficient and rational mechanism of coordination for Williamson, owing to the fact that 
the collective agreement (concluded between the employer and the union) is incomplete. 
Thus, Williamson shows that this incompleteness is a ‛concession’ (1975: 75) on the 
circumscribed rationality. Rather than anticipating all the events that could occur, the 
agreement is voluntarily incomplete and, therefore, flexible, which makes it ‛attractive’ 
but also ‛hazardous’ (Williamson, 1975). That is why contractors implement specific 
arbitration machinery. Williamson (1975) explains that ‛a grievance procedure, with 
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impartial arbitration as the usual final step, allows the firm and the workers to deal with 
continually changing conditions in a relatively non-litigious manner’ and concludes that 
‛contract revision and renewal take place in an atmosphere of mutual restraint, in which 
the parties are committed to continuing accommodation’ (Williamson, 1975: 81).  
Williamson is very critical of the alternative model of disputes settlement, which he 
calls ‛the judicial model.’ This model has been described in the works of Stone (1981, 
2007). According to her, the supposed advantages of arbitration (the expertise of 
arbitrator, the informal aspect of the procedures, and the flexibility of the 
recommendations) could also be achieved if conflicts were settled by the NLRB. In 
contrast, for Williamson, entrusting to the NLRB, and so to a judicial entity, means that 
the settlement of disputes does not allow the parties to harmonise their interests by 
adapting their contractual relationship on a long-term basis. Consequently, imposing on 
parties a judicial regulation could lead them to give up making investments in specific 
assets (Williamson, 1985). 
To conclude this first section, we argue that the Williamson analysis ultimately 
uses a large part of the recommendations proposed by the theorists and partisans of 
industrial pluralism, who have largely influenced the evolution of American labour 
relationships from the 1930s to the 1980s. Industrial pluralism is an application of the 
idea of political pluralism – which is at the heart of free market democracy – to 
collective labour relationships. In this model that developed on the basis of the Wagner 
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Act, parties to collective bargaining are seen as a sort of ‛legislative assembly’ that 
publishes its own legal norms. These norms are submitted to the arbitrator of 
grievances, who is a private judge nominated by the parties themselves (Stone, 1992). 
As Stone argues, industrial pluralism is based on a simple metaphor: collective 
bargaining is designed as an ‛industrial self-government’ (Stone, 1992: 622). One of the 
more important arguments in favour of the industrial pluralism model is about the fact 
that disputes based on collective agreement are not dealt with by courts. The Supreme 
Court of United States used, for a long time, the arguments developed by the partisans 
of industrial pluralism and considered that the collective agreement constituted a real 
constitutional law, with its own judge – the arbitrator – to control the process. In this 
view, employees were submitted to the legal and imperative enforceability of the 
convention. Finally, the study of the works of Williamson on collective labour 
relationships seems to be a confirmation of the logic that this author develops when he 
analyses the institutions of capitalism: from the lens of organisational failures, the aim 
is to show that the rules governing the firm and the employment relationship are based 
on economizing logic (minimisation of transaction costs).   
The positive and normative limitations of Williamson’s approach to 
the private ordering: A critical analysis of the Williamsonian 
conception of law 
As we have explained in the previous section, the theoretical framework of Williamson, 
which is based on the public ordering–private ordering divide, is, in part, in line with 
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the collective labour relationships that predominated in the United States from 1930s to 
the 1970s. However, the divide that Williamson proposes is not clear, and furthermore, 
his analysis has become obsolete on numerous points owing to the large modifications 
that have affected labour relationships since the 1980s. Additionally, the limitations 
internal to the private ordering model, as such, have also cast doubt on this model, 
which raises the question of the role of the State in labour relationships regulation.  
The American model of collective labour relationships: legal pluralism and the 
decline in the collective convention 
Two main critical assessments of Williamson’s positive analysis of collective labour 
relationships can be addressed. The first one is about the confusion he introduces 
between the judicial model of the public ordering and the private ordering model. The 
second assessment concerns the concealment of the important mutation that American 
labour law has been set against since the 1980s.  
It seems that Williamson makes a strong distinction between the legal domain and 
the economic domain characterised by economizing logic. As a consequence, 
Williamson seems to ultimately neglect the role of positive law and institutions, such as 
State, Court and judge, in the functioning rules of governance structures. In fact, we 
argue that the position of Williamson is more complex. In our view, this ambiguity 
results from the notion of ‛private ordering’ that points out the fact that this ordering is 
totally dissociated from the public ordering system. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
mitigate this argument. In fact, the American model of collective labour relationships is 
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based on what lawyers call ‛legal pluralism’ (Galanter, 1966, 1981; Hooker, 1975; 
Griffiths, 1986; Merry, 1986). This notion characterises the approach to law that was in 
favour with a lot of American lawyers, who used the collective labour relationships 
model of the post-Second World War period. In the view of this specific approach, law 
is not confused with State authority because there are plenty of generative sources and 
autonomous seats of law that compete with the public domain of law. The model of 
collective labour relationships coming from the Wagner Act is in line with this analysis. 
From this perspective, the American firm is a law-creating entity. Indeed, American law 
establishes the principle of the normative autonomy of parties and, thus, creates a legal 
order distinct from the State order; this order is not opened to the external sources of 
law, such as legislator or judge. The recognition of private arbitration is a proof of this 
legal order.  
Nevertheless, can the normative autonomy of parties be reduced to private 
ordering? In our view, the answer is clearly ‛no’ because, in fact, this is an autonomy 
provided by the State. Unions and management must respect some important State 
rules. When Williamson speaks about private ordering, in fact, he refers to private legal 
rules, even though they are produced in a broader professional environment (in several 
articles, Williamson opposes his analysis of contract laws to the all-purpose laws of 
contracts, but he never uses the notion of legal pluralism, as such). In other words, there 
are different sources of law (the State, the firm, the employer) that coexist in modern 
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and occidental legal systems. That is why the methodology of Williamson is set a 
priori. The gap between public ordering and private ordering (levels 2 and 3 of the 
global Williamsonian analysing framework) – i.e., the gap between the judicial model 
and the private model – does not correspond to both the effective coordination and real 
sources of law that are, by their essence, plural.   
The study of labour relationships proposed by Williamson is also not accurate 
because, from a positive point of view, the 1980s were characterised by a double 
movement that has profoundly modified the model for the legal organisation of 
collective labour relationships. On the one hand, there was a real decline in the use of 
the model of the post-Second World War period. On the other hand, there has been a 
significant increase in the individual rights of employees (Stone, 1981, 1992, 2009; 
Supiot, 2010). The decline in the use of the post-Second World War model results from 
the remarkable decrease in the number of American union members. The percentage has 
decreased from 35% in the 1950s to less than 12% in 2008 (apRoberts and Simonet, 
2009). The new individual rights are provided by different sources. A portion of the 
sources refer to a liberal conception of employees’ rights that sheds light on the 
autonomy and private lives of employees. Other sources, like the measures concerning 
the closing of plants, portray the State’s willingness to protect employees against 
massive suppression of jobs and employment. Some of the rights involved are larger 
and aim to fight against unfair lay-offs. These rights are the product of judicial 
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innovations at the common law level, notably in the cases in which managers have lost 
their jobs in consequence of firm restructurings.  
In other words, in terms of the production of legal rules, it is the State that has 
become predominant and to the detriment of professional environment-based rules. 
Finally, these two movements – the increase in employees’ individual rights and the 
decrease in the protection given to employees by collective bargaining – are at the 
origins of a new model of labour relationships. This new effort is the ‛minimal 
terms/individual rights model of labour relations’ by Stone (1992: 636). Thus, we 
disagree with the fact that Williamson – who does not hesitate to revise his work by 
including a hybrid form in his 1991 article – has not taken into account the crucial 
modifications of the institutional environment that constitute, from the end of the 1970s 
and the beginning of the 1980s, the evolution of the American system of collective 
labour relationships. In this view, the divide between private ordering and public 
ordering is, nowadays, empirically accurate for only a very minor part of labour 
relationships. Collective bargaining, which was the main source of collective labour 
relationships, has become an exception, when, following economizing logic, collective 
bargaining must constitute a general rule of coordination. This important problem of the 
obsolescence of the theoretical Williamson is also evident in a normative point of view. 
The normative limitations of the Williamsonian analysis: a critical analysis of both 
the economizing logic and the poor relationships between the State, power, and law 
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We defend the idea that two types of criticism – by essence, different – can be 
addressed in the analysis of Willamson. The first one is linked to the limitations of the 
legal model of labour relationships resulting from the Wagner Act. The second one 
refers to the specific conception of both law and the relationship between law and power 
that Williamson develops.  
In the context of Williamsonian analysis, individuals implement institutions with 
an economizing logic, so that the model of collective relationships of the Wagner act is 
supposed to be an efficient model. However, we can be astonished by the reappraisal of 
this model. Indeed, the analysis of Williamson is not understandable in relation to the 
mechanisms of the evolution of institutions of capitalism. Two series of limitations 
linked to the evolution of the Wagner Act model have led to the undermining of this 
model.  
On the one hand, certain authors, like Stone (1981, 1992), do not agree with the 
analysis of Williamson that considers private arbitration an efficient mechanism of 
coordination. Stone argues that this system has not provided employees with 
satisfactory ways to enforce their collective rights. For her, arbitration is inefficient 
because it does not allow for utilising the protective devices of public courts. For 
example, the investigations that the arbitrator runs are much less complete than the 
investigations run by judicial institutions. Additionally, compensations required by 
arbitrators are not as effective and generous as compensations required by judicial 
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authorities; most arbitrators know that they do not have the power to impose and verify 
their decisions. Arbitrators are not forced by previous decisions, and decisions are not 
published. Lastly, by definition, there are no appeal rights for the ‛sentence’ pronounced 
by the arbitration.  
On the other hand, this model came to see minor use because of the disaffection of 
employees with unions. However, according to Stone, this disaffection results from the 
limitations inherent in this model, and, notably, from the dichotomy it created between 
the law coming from collective bargaining and that coming from State law. The private 
dimension of collective bargaining has made it legally incompatible with the new and 
emergent system of employees’ individual rights. Regarding the private aspect of 
dispute settlement through arbitration, we must note that the union member employees 
did not have access to courts – which is advocated by the partisans of industrial 
pluralism. More precisely, these employees whose claims were pre-empted did not 
benefit from both the external courts and tribunals and the elements of individual 
protection brought by the State as a consequence of the supremacy of collective 
agreement. This fact results from the interpretation of Section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act. Although the collective agreement was enforceable by a 
federal court, the restrictive interpretation that has been borrowed by the United States 
Supreme Court has led to the fact that all the claims on a collective agreement 
composed of an arbitration clause must be addressed with the arbitrator and not with a 
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court. Hence, the only recourse for the employee was the procedure involving the 
private arbitrator. Similar, in all the domains in which the States have extended the 
employees’ individual rights, the union member employees who have tried to affirm 
these rights have seen their claims pre-empted (Stone, 1992). Finally, the system of 
collective labour relationships coming from the Wagner Act has confirmed a divide 
between collective bargaining and employees’ individual rights. From this perspective, 
the State seems to be a sphere disconnected from the system of collective bargaining. 
However, it is important to add that refusing employees access to judicial courts has 
contributed to depriving employees of new individual rights that have been provided 
only since the 1980s.  
The second series of criticisms is about the conceptions of law and of the role of 
the State in the regulation of labour relationships that Williamson develops. By 
defending the principles of the autonomy of private regulation and of economizing 
reasoning, Williamson builds the idea that economic agents can coordinate 
independently of public judicial intervention. Though private ordering agreements are 
efficient, and thus positive, State law must be ‛put on the back burner’ and relegated to 
the background. However, one of the more important arguments of the partisans of 
interventionism in labour regulation is the one-sidedness of the position between 
employer and employees. That is why Williamson tries to show that the role of the State 
is useless in trying to create a balance. This issue is very interesting because, as 
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Williamson notices, the balancing of power between employers and employees is 
among the objectives of the Wagner Act. In this regard, Williamson quotes the works of 
Stone (1981), for whom the Act has created a ‛political reform’ in which law ‛must 
intervene actively to alter the definitions of property rights in order to create true 
equality’ (Stone, 1981: 1580). Additionally, Williamson considers that the balancing of 
power is an ambiguous criterion. In fact, he is very critical of the concept of power 
(Williamson 1985, 1995, 1996a) and considers that ‛the main problem with power is 
that the concept is so poorly defined that power can be and is invoked to explain 
virtually anything’ (1985: 237–238). To reinforce his position, Williamson does not 
hesitate to quote March (1966), who thinks that ‘power is a disappointing concept’ 
(1966: 70). 
Williamson is convinced that restoring balanced power relationships from law is a 
vague and consequently irrelevant initiative. According to him, the intervention of State 
positive law to protect employees’ rights is needless because there are other instruments 
and mechanisms that depend on the private ordering domain and that infuse order and 
prevent conflicts. There are three main mechanisms that fit into this picture.  
The first instrument involves collective bargaining that allows for the 
implementation of mechanisms fostering investments in specific assets. The rules of the 
internal labour market are central here. Employees who try to escape from the power of 
the employer can choose either to invest in human assets that can be deployed elsewhere 
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or to invest in specific assets. However, in the last case, they want, ex ante, to have a 
‛protective governance structure’ (Williamson, 1985), namely, the rules of the internal 
labour market. In the case of the second instrument, employers have an interest in 
keeping ‛their’ employees and, therefore, do not want to exploit their position; 
otherwise, they would have to endure some important turnover costs, and employees 
would not invest in specific assets. The reputation of employers is also an important 
argument that plays an essential role. Finally, the third mechanism that Williamson uses 
applies to the possibility of adjusting the level of cooperation. According to him, 
employees who must accept less favourable work conditions have another defensive 
instrument, namely, their ability to not cooperate beyond the minimal level required in 
their contracts. Employees can ‛adjust quality to the disadvantage of a predatory 
employer’ (Williamson, 1985: 262). Because the employment contract is a long-term, 
incomplete contract, Williamson (1975) affirms that each employee is able to choose 
between two types of cooperation: the perfunctory (minimal) cooperation and the 
consummate (maximum) cooperation. 
These three instruments are questionable. Concerning the first one, collective 
negotiation does not allow for really achieving a real balancing of power relationships. 
In fact, except for some items, such as the determination of wages, the rules of 
promotion, and the physical conditions of production, collective bargaining did not 
address many strategic aspects of the management of the firm, such as investment 
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policy or price policy. In other words, as Stone (1981) explains, ‛management and labor 
do not resemble political parties in a legislature that jointly determine the rules of the 
workplace; doctrines, such as retained rights and the mandatory permissive bargaining 
distinction, limit the union’s ability to contribute equally to the most crucial aspects of 
plant life’ (Stone, 1981: 1566).  
Though employees are not passive and powerless facing their employer, some 
believe that a strong limitation exists on their ‛real ability’ to exert credible threats and 
punishments toward their employer. In this point of view, the absence of reference to 
the functioning rules and conditions of labour markets in the works of Williamson is a 
real problem insofar as the existence of a significant unemployment rate strongly 
reduces the ability of employees to implement credible threats (Bowles and Gintis, 
2008). In a world where there is a high level of unemployment, the analysis of power 
relationships is even more complex because it is difficult for employees to find a job 
again and to start a new cycle of valuable, specific human investments. Do employees 
really have the choice to invest or not invest in specific assets (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998)? For that matter, what does it mean to ‛invest in specific assets’? We leave these 
questions for future studies. 
It is important to say here that the reduction of the number of union members and 
the decline of the post-Second World War model raise, in new terms, the question of 
power relationships between employees and employers. Taking into account only rules 
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coming from unions and management to achieve a balancing of the labour relationship 
is inadequate. In this sense, the Williamsonian approach to law concurs with that of the 
partisans of ‛legal absenteeism’ in labour law; the question of absenteeism was crucial 
in the United Kingdom during the 20th century (Collins, 1987). This issue can be linked 
to the conception of industrial pluralism. In light of these two currents of thought, 
collective bargaining is seen as a way to introduce democracy and justice in the firm. 
The partisans of absenteeism consider that legislative intervention is justified only in a 
few cases. Their main idea is the following: law must refrain from intervening because 
collective bargaining is sufficient to balance power relationships between employers 
and employees and, therefore, to resolve the contradiction between the values of civil 
society and the values of political society (Collins, 1987).  
The differences between the model of labour relationships in the United States and 
the French model of labour regulation are also very informative. In the United States, 
labour relationships have been considered private law contractual relationships, whereas 
in France these labour relationships have been submitted to public ordering rules 
intended to protect the weaker party in the contract (see Supiot, 2010, on the evolution 
of these two models of labour law). The American model, very well explained by 
Williamson, is ultimately based on economizing logic, whereas the French model rests 
more on a political conception of labour relationships. As a consequence, the American 
model can function and can contribute to the balancing of power between employers 
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and employees only if there is a union representation powerful enough to foster this 
balancing. However, as we have previously explained, the growing disaffection of 
employees with unions and the limitations due to the absence of openness to external 
sources of law have led to the marginalisation of this model, with labour relations law 
being limited, in these circumstances, to only the individual contract.  
Conclusion 
The originality and analytical insights of Williamson’s works relate to the building of a 
legal and economic approach to the internal organisation of capitalist firms 
(Williamson, 1984). Williamson considers his theory to be an unorthodox one 
(Williamson, 1996b) that strongly differs from the Chicago legal and economic 
approach (Posner, 1979). However, academic literature often undermines this originality 
and ignores, as a blind spot, the question of the critical assessment of this legal and 
economic approach to the firm and to labour relationships. This article aims to fill in 
this gap in literature by proposing a critical analysis of the conception of law that 
Williamson defends in his analysis of the management of labour relationships. More 
exactly, the objective of Williamson is to show both that the private ordering-public 
ordering divide is empirically justifiable and that the model of private ordering is more 
efficient than the model of public ordering.  
From a positive perspective, we note that the Williamsonian analysis is well-
founded regarding the post Second World War American model of collective labour 
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relationships regulation – at least, concerning the so-called organised sector. 
Nevertheless, we have seen that the evolution of this model and its limitations have 
contributed to a large reduction in the role of the private ordering model in labour 
relationships regulation. The role played by the organised sector has, thus, become quite 
minor. Consequently, it is the individual labour contract and not the collective 
convention that is the dominant model of regulation of labour relationships. It is a 
model in which the State has a strong role to play and is the first and main source of 
law. Additionally, what Williamson calls private ordering depends, in fact, upon the 
perspective on legal pluralism. This argument leads us to put the economizing logic and 
efficient reasoning that justifies the superiority of the private ordering model into 
perspective. However, it also causes us to argue that it is these very limitations that have 
led to the disaffection of employees with this model.  
Thus, the theoretical framework of Williamson and the resulting analysis that he 
makes are of little interest and even seem to be irrelevant in the light of the current 
situation of labour relationships in the United States. That is why, to conclude, we want 
to draw the attention of readers to the necessity of adding to the Williamsonian 
incomplete analysis a historical viewpoint to shed light on the crucial issue of 
institutional change (North et al., 2009). 
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